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1Abstract
This paper analyzes endogenous ¯scal policy in an endogenous growth model
where agents care about social status and environmental quality. The quest for
a higher status is assimilated to a preference for capital wealth. The government
uses income tax to ¯nance infrastructure and environmental protection. We ¯nd
that accounting for preferences for social status and environmental quality may
lead to an allocation of tax revenue in favor of a cleanup e®ort to the detriment
of infrastructure. It does not necessary have a negative impact on growth. Status
seeking can however harm economic growth and environmental quality when its
motive is important enough. Finally, we show that economic growth is consistent
with environmental preservation but is not necessarily welfare-improving as in the
case of absence of status-seeking behavior.
Keywords: Endogenous policy; endogenous growth; environmental quality; status-
seeking; public expenditure; Wagner's law
JEL Classi¯cation: D9; H31; O41; Q58
21 Introduction
The relationship between growth and environment has been extensively explored in the
literature. The emergence of endogenous growth theories in the last two decades has
provided a novel framework to address the sustainability issue and especially the role of
public policy in improving environmental quality. In this respect, the works of Jones and
Manuelli (2001) and Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) are particularly appealing.
These authors pleaded for environmental protection policy, which was also recommended
by Arrow et al. (1995), and suggested that policy choice should be considered as a
source of cross-country heterogeneity in terms of economic performance and environmental
quality. Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) studied a second-best optimal policy in an
endogenous growth model with renewable ressource. The latter is depleted by economic
activity but can be maintained by cleanup policy. The government chooses the tax rate
and the allocation of tax revenue between infrastructure spending and cleanup e®ort by
maximizing individual welfare. Their results show that the more individuals care about
the environment, the more growth-enhancing policy should be chosen.
However, these works used the traditional approach on economic growth, which em-
phasizes the supply-side of the economy and assumes that individual preferences are
exogenous and independent of any social interaction. Accounting for the relative position
of individuals in society would lead to considering alternative economic models, includ-
ing particularly those with endogenous preferences and relative utility. Several recent
researches show that individuals care about their relative positions in society and recom-
mend a broader use of these models in environmental studies (van den Bergh et al. 2000,
Brekke and Howarth 2002). Empirical evidence supporting relative utility can be found in
numerous works on subjective well-being (Clark and Oswald 1996, Kapteyn et al. 1997,
3Clark et al. 2008). Most of them found that an individual's utility depends not only on
her income but also on a reference income.
The conjecture of relative utility dates back to The Theory of Moral Sentiments by
Smith (1759) and The Theory of the Leisure Class by Veblen (1899), and was emphasized
by Duesenberry (1949). The latter author postulated that there is a comparison e®ect in
the consumption between individuals (see also Rauscher 1997, Alonso-Carr¶ era et al. 2008).
Human capital accumulation as a motive of status was also suggested by, e.g., Frank (1985)
and Fershtman et al. (1996). Capital wealth-enhanced social status was incorporated
in numerous growth models (Corneo and Jeanne 2001a, b, Long and Shimomura 2004,
Pham 2005,, Stark 2006 etc.). This literature emphasizes the role of the demand side as
a determinant of growth, i.e. status-seeking behavior leads to a higher growth.
Endogenizing individual preferences can help avoiding the consequences of making
wrong decision in valuing environmental externalities and designing public policy (Gowdy
2004). Indeed, status-seeking behavior may have an impact on the level and the structure
of optimal tax. For example, the quest for a higher social status raises capital wealth
accumulation (recognized as a measure of social status) to the detriment of current con-
sumption and total public expenditure chosen by agents. However, if an individual cares
about environmental quality, the cleanup e®ort will be higher because production de-
grades the environment. Consumption or wealth-enhanced status may therefore lead to
an excessive consumption or an excessive capital wealth accumulation, and an environ-
mental degradation in the market economy (Ng and Wang 1993). This will result in a
more agressive policy than in the case without status e®ects (Howarth 1996, Brekke et
al. 2003). In line with this research, by studying the optimal tax in an OLG model with
consumption that harms the environment, Wendner (2003) concluded that status-seeking
raises the optimal tax rate on consumption and reduces that on capital income. In Brekke
4and Howarth (2002, chapter 9), the assumption that social status is measured by relative
capital wealth gives rise to a long-run growth path with excessive capital accumulation
and may lead ¯rms to employ polluting technologies inducing excessive pollution in the
short-run. Moreover, it is shown that the optimal tax on consumption is set to zero, and
capital is taxed at a rate equal to the individual marginal willingness to pay in order to
neutralize the status externality related to capital accumulation.
Our paper aims to study how individual behavior impacts public decision on envi-
ronmental protection and infrastructure spending in an endogenous growth model. As
in Economides and Phillipopoulos (2008), we consider that income tax (¯nancing pub-
lic program) and the allocation of tax revenue between cleanup and infrastructure are
welfare-maximizing. Our study di®ers from this work as we provide an analysis of im-
pacts of endogenous individual preferences on the choice of income tax rate and on the
allocation of tax revenue between infrastructure spending and cleanup e®ort. In partic-
ular, we assume that agents care about consumption, environmental quality, and social
status. The latter is de¯ned in terms of relative capital wealth (Long and Shimomura
2004, Pham 2005). As underlined previously, the presence of the status-seeking behavior
will lead to an excessive capital accumulation and ignoring the in°uence of social sta-
tus may therefore yield a long-run equilibrium at which environmental quality is higher
(and then it is not a priority), which can generate a higher allocation of tax revenue for
infrastructure to the detriment of a cleanup e®ort.
We show that environmental quality may be considered as a `luxury good' and that
status-seeking behavior may constitute a justi¯cation for environmental expenditure,
which could be a valid explanation of Wagner's law (following which the ratio of gov-
ernment expenditure to GDP is positively related to GDP per capita). We also show
that accounting for preferences for social status and environmental quality may lead to
5an allocation of tax revenue in favor of a cleanup e®ort to the detriment of infrastructure.
However, this choice is not necessarily harmful for economic growth as the latter is partly
explained by a high capital wealth accumulation due to the quest for status. Nevertheless,
status concern may be harmful for economic growth and environmental quality when its
motive is important enough. Finally, we show that economic growth is consistent with
environmental preservation but it is not necessarily welfare-improving as in the case of
absence of status-seeking behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses
the intertemporal political-economic equilibrium where the ¯scal policy is chosen from a
two-step decision process: given public policy, the representative household determines her
consumption and her private capital, the representative ¯rm chooses its production, and
then the altruist government determines the allocation of tax revenue that maximizes
the household's utility subject to private decisions. Section 4 presents the impacts of
status and environment concerns on ¯scal policy, sustainable growth and the relationship
between growth and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that the economy has a continuum of in¯nitely-lived identical households
uniformly distributed in [0;1]. Competitive ¯rms produce a consumption good from three
inputs: private capital, public capital, and labor. This production degrades environmental
quality, which has an externality e®ect on the household's utility. As in Kempf and
Rossignol (2007), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), we assume that the government
uses income tax to ¯nance public capital and environmental protection.
62.1 Individuals' preferences
Each individual has an initial endowment of capital, k0 > 0, and is supposed to supply
one unit of labor at each period. Her preferences for consumption, environmental quality,













where 0 < ¯ < 1, 0 < µ < 1. The ¯rst term of the instantaneous utility function
expresses the satisfaction from consumption ct, the second from environmental quality
Et, and the last from status seeking kt
Kµ
t . Parameter µ may be interpreted as the degree
of the individual's social interaction (Jellal and Rajhi 2003).
As underlined previously, status-seeking behavior, which is a way of modeling endoge-
nous preferences, enables us to avoid consequences of making wrong public decisions. In
our model, status is expressed in terms of relative wealth ( kt
Kµ
t ) and the associated coef-
¯cient, sK, represents the relative importance that the individual gives to her status in
society. When sK = 0, the utility function has a classical form, i.e. utility is absolute,
and individual preferences only depend on consumption and environmental quality as de-
scribed in Economides and Phillippopoulos (2008). Utility is relative when sK > 0 and
µ > 0. We assume that sK + sE 2 [0;1) to avoid extreme con¯gurations where consump-
tion is not important at all (sK+sE = 1) and only social status and environmental quality
ensure the household's survival.1
1The result remains unchanged when using the utility function with the form sC lnct + sE lnEt +
sK ln(kt=Kµ
t ) with sC + sK + sE 6= 1.
72.2 Environmental quality
As in John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995), environmental quality evolves
according to:
Et+1 = (1 ¡ m)Et + aGEt ¡ byt; m;a;b > 0 (2)
where byt is environmental degradation relative to production at t, aGEt corresponds
to environmental improvement from public pollution abatement. The e®ectiveness of
environmental policy is expressed by the exogenous parameter a > 0.
Et is a public good indicating an index of environmental quality, e.g. soil quality,
air quality, groundwater, or some biodiversity index. Without any economic activity,
environmental quality has an autonomous level of zero. The parameter m 2 [0;1] measures
the natural speed of reversion of environmental quality to this level.2
2.3 Production technology









where A corresponds to the technological level. The aggregate variable Zt, which is the
stock of public capital at t, is assumed to be a pure public good. Variable kt and lt
2As in John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995), environmental quality is assumed to be
always positive in order to justify the logarithmic form in the utility function. Other forms than in
equation (2) were proposed by Aghion and Howitt (1998, chapter 5) where E, measured as the distance
between the current environmental quality to its upper limit, is always lower or equal to zero. The
zero value corresponds then to the upper limit in the case of absence of human activity. Moreover,
when environmental quality is considered as a °ow, factors a®ecting it (consumption, production, capital,
pollution abatement, etc.) can be modeled in a nonseparable way, such as the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation
(see, e.g., Smulders 2000, and Xepapadeas 2005).
8are private capital and labor respectively. For simplicity's sake, we assume that private
capital at t + 1 depends on private investment at t:
kt+1 = it: (4)
Our model is a discrete version of Barro's (1990) model with the modi¯cation that
public capital is introduced into the production process as a stock, instead of a °ow
variable.3 We assume that public capital is entirely depreciated at each period, i.e. public
capital at t + 1 is equal to public investment at t:
Zt+1 = GZt: (5)
2.4 Public sector
The overall public expenditure is ¯nanced by income tax:
Gt = ¿t(wtlt + rtkt) (6)
where ¿t is the tax rate at time t. We also assume that a share ² of public expenditure
is devoted to the provision of public capital and the remaining 1 ¡ ² to environmental
protection. We rewrite (6) as
Gt = GZt + GEt = ²¿t (wtlt + rtkt) + (1 ¡ ²)¿t (wtlt + rtkt): (7)
Equivalently, we can rewrite the above equation as
Gt = GZt + GEt = (°Zt + °Et)(wtlt + rtkt) (8)
where °Zt and °Et are respectively the ratio of infrastructure expenditure to income and
that of environmental expenditure to income. Public policy can be therefore summa-
3Similar models, without social status or environment, were proposed by Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994, 1995), Lau (1995), etc.
9rized by °Zt and °Et that we can also call infrastructure and environmental tax rates,
respectively.
3 Equilibrium
We study in this section the political-economic equilibrium which results from a sequential
process. In other words, at the beginning of each period, ¯scal policy is chosen before
consumption, production, and wealth accumulation decisions.4 Taking ¯scal policy and
environmental quality as given, the household and the ¯rm will make their own deci-
sions. We have then a two-step decision design. In the ¯rst step, the representative ¯rm
maximizes its pro¯t by choosing the pro¯le of production factors. The representative
household maximizes her utility by choosing her consumption and her saving (private
investment) given ¯scal policy and environmental quality. A competitive equilibrium is
therefore de¯ned. In the second step, the altruist government determines the allocation
of tax revenue by maximizing the household's utility subject to private decisions at the
competitive equilibrium. The political-economic equilibrium resulting from this two-step
procedure corresponds then to a second-best allocation. This sequential process was often
considered as a voting mechanism in a democratic economy as in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1995), Krusell et al. (1997), Jones and Manuelli (2001), among others. Hereafter, we de-
rive the private decisions at the competitive equilibrium and the allocation of tax revenue
determined by the government.
4Some authors assumed that the tax rate is ¯xed at the beginning of time and remains constant
subsequently (see, e.g., Lau 1995, and Fiaschi 1999).
103.1 Consumption and investment decisions










t ¡ wtlt ¡ rtkt (P1)
with lt;kt > 0; t = 0;1;::: The price of the consumption good is normalized to unity.
Factor prices, ¯scal policy, and environmental quality are considered as given. First-order





















Given ¯scal policy, factor prices, and environmental quality, the representative house-
hold determines her consumption, ct, and her investment, it (or private capital kt+1), by

















> > > > > <
> > > > > :
ct + kt+1 = (1 ¡ °Zt ¡ °Et)(wtlt + rtkt);








First-order conditions from (P2) are











This relation represents the equality between the marginal cost (in terms of utility) of a
reduction of one unit of consumption good at t (left-hand side) and the marginal bene¯t
of an increase of one unit of private capital at t + 1 (right-hand side). This bene¯t is
11composed by two elements: the marginal utility of capital at time t+1, sK=kt+1, and the
product between the net marginal return of saving (private investment at t), (1¡¿t+1)rt+1,
and the marginal utility of consumption at t + 1, (1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)=ct+1.
De¯nition 1 Given initial values k0;Z0;E0 > 0 and sequences f°Zt;°Et;Zt+1;Et+1g1
t=0,




t=0 is the solution of the pro¯t-maximization program of the competitive ¯rm
(P1),
(ii) fct;kt+1g1
t=0 is the solution of the optimization program of the household (P2),
(iii) ct+kt+1 = (1 ¡ °Et ¡ °Zt)yt, lt = 1, kt = Kt, yt = AZ®
t k
1¡®
t and Zt = ¿Z;t¡1(wt¡1+
rt¡1kt¡1).
At the competitive equilibrium, we have
ct =
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) kt
ct¡1 ¡ ¯sK




¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) kt
ct¡1 ¡ ¯sK
#
(1 ¡ °Zt ¡ °Et)yt (13)
Zt+1 = °Ztyt (14)
Et+1 = (1 ¡ m)Et + (a°Et ¡ b)yt (15)
¿t = °Zt + °Et: (16)
3.2 Economic and environmental policies
We now discuss how the government ¯nances environmental protection and public good
provision. We recall that °Zt is the ratio of infrastructure expenditure to income, and °Et
the ratio of environmental expenditure to income. The altruist government faces a trade-
o® between costs and bene¯ts of increased °Zt and °Et. On the one hand, an increase of
°Zt and °Et at period t will reduce the after-tax income, causing a drop of consumption
12and private capital accumulation at the same period. It will reduce current utility and
future production (and then future income). On the other hand, higher tax rates at t
increase public expenditure devoted to environmental protection and public investment,
which will consequently foster the future household's utility.






t [(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)lnct + sE lnEt + sK(1 ¡ µ)lnkt] (P3)
subject to
ct =
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) kt
ct¡1 ¡ ¯sK




¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) kt
ct¡1 ¡ ¯sK
#
(1 ¡ °Zt ¡ °Et)yt
Zt+1 = °Ztyt






k0, Z0 and E0 taken as given, °Zt;°Et 2 [0;1), and °Zt + °Et 2 [0;1).
Thanks to the logarithm form and the separability of the utility, the choice of tax
rates at t is independent of those at t¡1 and t+1. By plugging the constraints into the





­(°Zt;°Et) = [(1 + ¯ ¡ ®¯)(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) + ¯sK(1 ¡ µ)]ln(1 ¡ °Zt ¡ °Et) +
®¯(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)ln°Zt + ¯sE ln[(1 ¡ m)Et + (a°Et ¡ b)yt] + ³;
where ³ contains other variables and parameters independent of °Zt and °Et. First-order
13conditions of this program give the following relationship between °Zt and °Et:
°Et =
sE°Zt














t=0 are the values de¯ned at the competitive equilibrium
(ii) f°Zt;°Etg1
t=0 is the solution of the voter's optimization program (P3),
(iii) ct + kt+1 = (1 ¡ °Et ¡ °Zt)yt, lt = 1, kt = Kt,


























X = (1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)(1 + ¯) + ¯sK(1 ¡ µ): (20)
We observe that the ratio of environmental expenditure to income rises with income










Environmental protection (being more important if °Et is higher) is not a priority in
low income countries where most public expenditure is devoted to economic development
to the detriment of environmental protection. This result appears particularly consis-
tent with empirical ¯ndings. In particular, Pearce and Palmer (2001) found that public
14environmental expenditure is positively correlated with GDP and that the elasticity of
environmental expenditure with respect to GDP is statistically greater than unity.5 This
result also constitutes a plausible explanation of the Wagner's law which states that the
ratio of government expenditure to GDP is positively related to GDP per capita.6 In-
deed, even if the infrastructure expenditure ratio decreases when the economy grows,
the total public expenditure ratio continues to expand ( @¿t
@yt > 0), due to the increase of
environmental protection expenditure (
@°Et
@yt > 0).
Another observation is that the environmental expenditure ratio decreases with en-








This is also rather intuitive as one may feel less urgent to improve environmental quality
when it is already high. To summarize, an increase of environmental expenditure may be
explained either by an increase of income or by an environmental deterioration.
5In a similar study, Magnani (2000) found that log of public R&D expenditure per capita is increasing
with GDP per capita. However, the author did not compute the elasticity of public R&D expenditure
with respect to GDP. Moreover, as underlined by Pearce and Palmer (2001), data used in Magnani (2000)
only constitute between 1 and 2 percent of total public environmental expenditure.
6Recently, Shelton (2007) looked at cross-country data on public expenditure (defense, education,
health care) at di®erent levels (local, central) of government and found a result consistent with Wagner's
law. Shelton (2007) explained that Wagner's law may be explained by the redistribution policy in rich
countries or by demographic factors. Thus, even if other expenditure declines, richer countries do spend
more on social security due to population ageing, resulting in higher total expenditure per capita than
in poorer countries.
154 Steady-state analysis
We transform all the variables to make them stationary. From (12) and (13), the ratio













¯ [sK + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sE ¡ sK)]
(1 + ®¯ ¡ ¯)
: (23)
Current consumption and future private capital can be rewritten as:
ct = Á(1 ¡ °Zt ¡ ¿Kt)yt
kt+1 = (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ °Zt ¡ ¿Kt)yt
where
Á =
(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)(1 + ®¯ ¡ ¯)
[(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) + ¯sK]
:


































>From expression of °Et and °Zt in (18) and (19), it is straightforward to ¯nd that
Vt =
asE
®(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
; 8t: (26)
Furthermore, from (18) and (19), we obtain
°Zt
1 ¡ °Zt ¡ °Et
=
®¯(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
X ¡ ®¯(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)
: (27)
16Combining this expression with (24), it is found that Tt+1 only depends on kt=ct¡1, which
is constant at the steady-state (see equation (23)). Hence, the value of T is
T =
®(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)[¯sK + 1 ¡ sK ¡ sE]
[X ¡ ®¯(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE)][(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ sE) + ®sK]
: (28)
At the steady-state, all variables (consumption, private capital, public capital, and
environmental quality) grow at the same rate. We obtain the following result:
Result 2. The ratio of infrastructure expenditure to income and the ratio of environmen-
tal expenditure to income are respectively given by
°Z =
















+ bX + a¯sE
¸
; (30)
where X, V , and T are given in (20), (26), and (28) respectively.
This result can be better understood with a numerical exercise. For this purpose, we
use the following parameter values: ® = 0:7, A = 5, ¯ = 0:8, µ = 0:5, a = 1, and b = 0:2.
The results are displayed in Figures 1 to 3. We analyze how status concern (measured
by sK) and environmental concern (sE) a®ect public decisions. E®ects of sK on °Z, °E,
¿, and g are computed by ¯xing sE at an arbitrary value, here we choose sE = 0:2. And
vice versa, we choose sK = 0:2 when studying the e®ects of sE.7
We observe that status-seeking behavior (sK) has two opposite e®ects on °E (Figure
1a). On the one hand, a stronger status concern implies lower total public expenditure
(i.e. smaller ¿) and then lower environmental protection expenditure. On the other hand,
the government is aware that a stronger status concern will foster an excessive capital
wealth accumulation and then degrade the environment. Hence, the government will
raise environmental expenditure (i.e. higher °E) to counterbalance this degradation. This
7The results remain very similar when sE and sK are ¯xed at other values.
17result is compatible with that found in the previous section concerning the allocation of
tax revenue at the competitive equilibrium, according to which a higher public investment
will be associated with a higher environmental protection (see equation (17)). When
status concern is weak, the positive e®ect dominates, i.e. °E is higher. On the contrary,
when status concern becomes su±ciently strong, environmental protection receives a lower
priority than wealth accumulation, yielding a smaller °E.
The relationship between °E and sE is also non monotonous as described in Figure 1b.
Actually, an increase of sE, representing the weight of environmental preference, has two
opposite e®ects on °E. It raises the ratio of environmental expenditure °E (direct e®ect).
Simultaneously, it diminishes the ratio of infrastructure expenditure °Z, which reduces
production and environmental degradation. Consequently, environmental protection be-
comes less urgent, resulting in a lower value of °E (indirect e®ect). The increasing part of
the curve °E corresponds to the situation where the direct e®ect dominates the indirect
one.
Figure 1: Impacts of status and environmental concerns on environmental expenditure.
18Figure 2: Impacts of status and environmental concerns on infrastructure expenditure.
Figure 3: Impacts of status and environmental concerns on the overall public expenditure.
19Figure 4: Impacts of status and environmental concerns on the growth rate.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the evolution of public expenditure with respect to changes
in status and environmental concerns given other parameters. Status-seeking behavior
exerts a negative e®ect on infrastructure expenditure (Figure 2a). Indeed, other things
being equal, a higher value of sK corresponds to a higher utility derived from social status
compared to the utility derived from consumption and that from environmental quality.
This implies a higher capital wealth accumulation to the detriment of consumption, of
overall public expenditure (Figure 3a) and, particularly, of infrastructure expenditure.
This explanation is also valid for the negative e®ect of sE on infrastructure expenditure
(Figure 2b).
While Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) predicted a negative relationship be-
tween environmental concern and the ratio of overall expenditure to income, our model
provides rather a non-monotonous relationship (Figure 3b). Actually, the impact of en-
vironmental concern (sE) on the overall public expenditure (¿) depends on the positive
e®ect of sE on °E and the negative e®ect of sE on °Z. It is positive when the former e®ect
20dominates the latter.
Result 3. The long-run growth rate of the economy is
g = lnA + ln°Z ¡ (1 ¡ ®)lnT; (31)
where T is given in (28).
We observe that the relationship between the growth rate (g) and status motive (sK)
has an inverted-U shaped form. Our ¯nding is di®erent from most existing studies which
found that status-seeking exerts a positive e®ect on the growth rate (see, e.g., Rauscher
1997, Corneo and Jeanne 1997, 2001b). Their result may be explained by the fact that,
in their models, status concern is directed toward a producible asset (i.e. capital wealth).
Therefore, individuals are encouraged to invest in wealth accumulation in order to acquire
a higher social status as in our model. However, our paper adds another e®ect, i.e. the
negative e®ect on growth of status preferences via tax rates. Indeed, when economic
policy is welfare-maximizing, a stronger status-seeking motive has a negative e®ect on
public investment (@°Z=@sK < 0, see Figure 3b), generating a lower output. This e®ect
will dominate the positive one when the status-seeking motive is strong enough, giving
the decreasing part of the curve g in Figure 4a.8
Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) underlined that when agents care about the
environment, this requires extra revenue for a cleanup policy which can only be achieved
by a large tax base and a high growth rate. Our model gives the same prediction when
environmental concern is relatively not important. The increasing part of g in Figure 4b
may be explained by the fact that an increase of sE may imply a consumption concern
8We note that with exogenous policies, the growth rate of the economy is given by ¹ g = lnA + (1 ¡
®)ln¼ + ®ln°Z + (1 ¡ ®)ln(1 ¡ °Z ¡ °E), where ¼ =
¯[(1¡®)(1¡sE)+®sK]
1¡sK¡sE+¯sK . In this case, the relationship
between status preference and growth rate is positive.
21(1 ¡ sK ¡ sE) relatively lower than the status concern. In this case, agents may be
more willing to accumulate capital wealth than to consume, which induces higher growth.
Taking preferences for environmental quality into account may yield an allocation of tax
revenue in favor of a cleanup policy to the detriment of infrastructure. This choice is not
necessarily harmful for economic growth as growth is partly explained by an excessive
accumulation of capital wealth for higher status. However, when environmental concern
is very high, agents may privilege environmental expenditure rather than infrastructure,
providing a lower growth rate (see the decreasing part of curve g in Figure 4b).
We turn now to the link between individual lifetime utility and sustainable growth.
This relationship has received particular attention from numerous works in the literature.
For example, Ng (2008) proposed an `environmentally responsible happy nation index'
that accounts for a measure of happiness and a global environment impact of the econ-
omy. Other authors explored the relationship between proxies of happiness and various
measures of sustainable growth and environmental quality (e.g., Bonini 2008, Engelbrecht
2008, Zidan· sek 2007). In particular, Zidan· sek (2007) suggested a possibility of improv-
ing happiness and sustainability simultaneously.9 Here, we ¯nd a similar result when
economic growth is not high enough. Let us note that
lnxt = lnx0 + gt; x = c;k;E;8t > 0;
where c0 = (1¡°Z ¡°E)y0¡k1 = (1¡°Z ¡°E)y0¡k0eg and y0 = AZ®
0 k
1¡®
0 . The lifetime
9Zidan· sek (2007) investigated the relationship between three measures of happiness and two environ-
mental sustainability indicators and found a causal link in both direction, i.e. happier agents care about
the environment and a better environment makes them happy.
22utility of the household is














(1 ¡ sE ¡ sK)ln[(1 ¡ °Z ¡ °E)y0 ¡ k0eg]
1 ¡ ¯
+




(1 ¡ ¯)2 :
Result 4. The relationship between the individual's utility and the growth rate has an
inverted-U shaped form instead of a monotonous form as in the case without status. In
other words, we have
@U
@g
? 0 , g 7 ^ g;
where
^ g = ln[(1 ¡ sKµ)(1 ¡ °Z ¡ °E)¯y0] ¡ ln[(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ sE ¡ sK) + ¯(1 ¡ sKµ)]k0:
Even if economic growth is consistent with environmental preservation, it is not nec-
essarily welfare-improving as in the case of absence of status-seeking behavior. There
is a compatibility between environmental preservation, economic growth and individual
welfare when the growth rate is smaller than threshold value ^ g, i.e. growth is only welfare-
improving when it is low enough.
Remark that empirical ¯ndings in the life satisfaction literature, which underlined the
absence of a positive correlation between individual life satisfaction and income (Easterlin
1974, 1995, Oswald 1997, among others) appear consistent with the result above. In
particular, Easterlin (1974), based on US data from 1946 to 1970, found that the average
level of American well-being did not signi¯cantly improve during the post-war decades
where rapid economic growth was observed. In another study, Easterlin (1995) took up
this question again and gave a negative answer to the question `Will raising the income
23of all increase the happiness of all?', suggesting that individual's utility depends on her
relative income, or her social status. As claimed by Earterlin (1974, 1995), this inverted-U
shaped feature supports the idea that relative utility constitutes an explanation of the
absence of correlation between welfare and income. This explanation was also attained
by de la Croix (1998) but in a di®erent theoretical setting where environmental quality is
neglected.
5 Concluding remarks
We study in this paper the consequences of status and environmental externalities on pub-
lic decision regarding environmental protection and infrastructure. We ¯nd that account-
ing for preferences for social status and environmental quality may lead to an allocation
of tax revenue in favor of a cleanup e®ort to the detriment of infrastructure. However,
economic growth is not necessarily reduced by this choice as it is partly explained by an
excessive accumulation of capital wealth due to the quest for status. Status concern may
be harmful for economic growth and environmental quality when its motive is important
enough. These results suggest that individual preferences should be considered as a pos-
sible explanation of the trade-o® between economic and environmental policies. They
can also explain the observed cross-country heterogeneity of the government size and of
the growth rate. We also show that economic growth is consistent with environmental
preservation but it is not necessarily welfare-improving as in the case of absence of status-
seeking behavior. This result is consistent with empirical ¯ndings in the life satisfaction
literature, which underlined the absence of a positive correlation between individual life
satisfaction and income.
Our results require some empirical investigation in a future work. The theoretical
24model deserves further analysis with a more general framework with, for example, a
nonseparable utility function. It would be also interesting to address the status-seeking
behavior in a model with heterogenous agents where the question of social mobility is
included.
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